The ECtHR Talpis v. Italy Judgment. Challenging the Osman Test through the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention? by DE VIDO, Sara
DOI 10.30687/Rg/2281-6100/2017/02/001
Submitted: 2018-07-27 | Accepted: 2018-09-04
© 2017 | cb Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License 203
Ricerche giuridiche e-ISSN 2281-6100
Vol. 6 – Num. 2 – Dicembre 2017
The ECtHR Talpis v. Italy Judgment
Challenging the Osman Test through the Council of 
Europe Istanbul Convention?
Sara De Vido
(Ricercatrice di Diritto internazionale  
nell’Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia)
Abstract This comment is meant as a first reaction to the Talpis v. Italy judgment, rendered by the 
European Court of Human Rights on 2 March 2017, and an attempt to reflect on legal obligations 
States have in countering violence against women, in light of the Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, adopted in 2011 in 
Istanbul and entered into force in 2014.
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1 Introduction
On 2 March 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rendered 
a landmark judgment on States’ positive obligations to counter domestic 
violence, in the case Talpis v. Italy1.
This comment2 is meant as a first reaction to the decision, and an at-
tempt to reflect on the legal obligations stemming from the Council of 
Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women 
and Domestic Violence, adopted in 2011 in Istanbul and entered into force 
1 European Court of Human Rights, Talpis v. Italy, Appl. No. 41237/14, 2 March 2017.
2 Please find the complete analysis, with a reflection on interpretation “in light of the Istan-
bul Convention”, in S. De Vido, “States” Positive Obligations to Eradicate Domestic Violence: 
The Politics of Relevance in the Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
ESIL in Reflection, 6, 6, July 2017. 
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in 2014 (hereinafter “Istanbul Convention”)3. The Convention, which Italy 
ratified in 2013, was mentioned in significant paragraphs of the judg-
ment under analysis, since it constitutes the most advanced legal instru-
ment existing at the regional or international level to combat violence 
against women and domestic violence. It is based on four pillars, namely 
Prevention, Protection, Prosecution and Policies, and obliges State par-
ties to adopt effective measures to counter gender-based violence against 
women, a widespread social phenomenon in Europe as well as in other 
areas of the world4. The Talpis case was examined under Article 2 (right 
to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment), 
and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in combination with Articles 
2 and 3, of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the 
“European Convention”). 
We argue that the Court has started to use the Istanbul Convention as 
a fundamental instrument to interpret positive legal obligations linked 
to the rights enshrined in the European Convention. In particular, the 
judgment contributes to the evolution of international human rights law 
in the protection of women’s rights, by gradually imposing a stricter due 
diligence standard with regard to obligations States must comply with in 
cases of domestic violence. 
2 The Facts of the Talpis v. Italy case
Born in Moldova, the applicant, Elisaveta Talpis, had lived in Remanzacco 
(Udine, a city in the North-East of Italy) with her husband and two children 
since their arrival in Italy, in 2011. As a consequence of some episodes 
of violence perpetrated by her husband, she filed a complaint with the 
authorities on 5 September 2012, a few months after finding a place in a 
women’s shelter managed by an association for the protection of women 
from violence. The Public Prosecutor ordered the police to investigate as 
a matter of urgency. It took seven months before the applicant could be 
heard by the police. On that occasion, she declared that the abuse was not 
as severe as she previously declared. She later explained that her husband 
put pressure on her. The Public Prosecutor decided to continue investi-
gation with regard to grievous bodily harm. On 25 November 2013, the 
applicant called the police. The agents arrived at her house, where they 
found the husband drunk. According to the declarations of the applicant 
3 Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210.
4 See, for example, the data of the WHO, published here http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs239/en/ and the data provided by the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights in a report of 2014 (http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2014/violence-against-women-
eu-wide-survey-main-results-report).
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and her son, the husband did not use violence against them. The man was 
driven to the hospital, from which he was discharged soon after. He was 
then stopped by the police on the streets, still drunk. At 5 in the morning, 
he entered his house and tried to attack his wife with a knife. Their son 
tried to stop his father, but the latter stabbed the young man to death. 
In the meantime, the applicant reached the street; her husband caught 
up with her and stabbed her. She survived. On 8 January 2015, the man 
was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of his son and the at-
tempted murder of his wife. Before the decision against her husband was 
delivered, Elisaveta Talpis had filed a complaint with the ECtHR against 
Italy, claiming the Italian authorities failed to protect her from her violent 
husband, who, after years of abuse, attempted to kill her and eventually 
killed their son.
3 The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights
The Court rejected the two arguments presented by the Italian govern-
ment with regard to admissibility, affirming that the period of six months 
within which the woman was entitled to file a complaint started from the 
date of the murder of the son’s applicant. The second argument concerning 
the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies was rejected by the Court while 
dealing with the alleged violation of Article 2 of the European Convention. 
On the merits, the Court referred to two of its previous judgments on 
domestic violence – namely the pioneering Opuz v. Turkey5, and the more 
recent Rumor v. Italy6. 
The Court found, by a majority of six votes against one, that Italy vio-
lated Article 2 of the European Convention, as a consequence of the death 
of the applicant’s son and the attempted murder of the applicant, and, 
by unanimity, that the State infringed Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion due to the failure of the authorities to protect the applicant against 
violence. The Court refused to analyse the case under Articles 8 and 13 
of the European Convention, and found a violation of the principle of non-
discrimination (Article 14 of the European Convention) by a majority of 
five votes against two. 
5 European Court of Human Rights, Opuz v. Turkey, Appl. No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009. 
6 European Court of Human Rights, Rumor v. Italy, Appl. No. 72964/10, 27 May 2014. 
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3.1 Challenging the Osman Test
With regard to Article 2 of the European Convention, the Court applied 
the so-called “Osman test”7. It provides that, in order to avoid an excessive 
burden on the authorities, the positive obligation to protect the right to life 
requires that the authorities «knew or ought to have known at the time of 
the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified indi-
vidual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they 
failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk»8. According to 
the majority of the judges, the real and immediacy requirement was met in 
the Talpis case. Given the circumstances of the case, the Court considered 
indeed that the husband constituted a real threat for the applicant, and 
that the State had an obligation to adopt concrete measures in order to 
protect the individual whose life was threatened. 
Two of the judges discussed the issue in their opinions, presenting diver-
gent positions. Judge Eicke, who wrote a partly dissenting opinion, posited 
that the Italian police should have been aware of the fact that the husband 
was under investigation and that he was charged with violence against 
his wife. In particular, on the night of the murder, the police officials, who 
stopped the applicant’s husband for an identity check, failed to adopt 
the measures within the scope of their powers that «judged reasonably, 
might have been expected to avoid that risk»9. Therefore, the conclusions 
of the Court were correct. Judge Spano dissented, and started his partly 
dissenting opinion with this sentence: «the law has its limits, even human 
rights law». Concerning the immediacy of the risk, the lapses of time 
between the initial police intervention and the murder (more than one 
year) proved that the requirement of immediacy was not met. Secondly, 
as to the reality of the risk, the judge contended that «diluting the Osman 
standard […] will simply impose an unrealistic burden on law enforcement 
authorities»10, and that the applicant’s husband lethal attack, a «volatile 
and unpredictable behaviour», could not «have been reasonably foreseen 
by the police»11. Arresting the husband could have been an option; how-
ever, if, on the one hand, States have obligations to effectively combat 
domestic violence, on the other hand, this fight «must be fought within 
7 European Court of Human Rights, Osman v. United Kingdom, no. 23452/94, 28 October 
1998.
8 Osman, cit., para. 116. 
9 Para. 8 of the opinion.
10 Para. 9 of the opinion.
11 Para. 11 of the opinion. 
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the boundaries of law, not outside»12.
The arguments of both judges are very interesting. It is true that the 
Court has usually stuck to the Osman test, but a “revised Osman test”, 
as suggested by Judge De Albuquerque in the case Valiuliene v. Lithua-
nia13, seems to have gradually entered the legal reasoning of the Court. 
Judge De Albuquerque acknowledged, in a case of domestic violence which 
caused to the victim minor bodily injuries, that the stage of “immediate 
risk” for a victim might be too late for the State to intervene, and that «a 
more rigorous standard of diligence is especially necessary» in societies 
where the problem of domestic violence is widespread. He reformulated 
the test as follows: «If a State knows or ought to know that a segment of 
its population, such as women, is subject to repeated violence and fails to 
prevent harm from befalling the members of that group of people when 
they face a present (but not yet imminent) risk, the State can be found 
responsible by omission for the resulting human rights violations. The 
constructive anticipated duty to prevent and protect is the reverse side of 
the context of widespread abuse and violence already known to the State 
authorities»14. The Court, in the Talpis v. Italy case, seems to follow the 
way paved by Judge De Albuquerque, where it stressed the “particular 
context” of domestic violence, and the aspect of repetition of violent acts15. 
Nonetheless, this conclusion cannot justify a disproportionate restriction 
of other rights. Hence, even though the arrest of Ms Talpis’ husband might 
have been a disproportionate measure, the officials could have driven the 
applicant’s husband to the hospital, or taken him home in order to assess 
whether the situation was safe. 
3.2 Domestic Violence as Torture
The second consideration regards Article 3 of the European Convention. 
The judges unanimously concluded that there was a violation of the pro-
hibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment enshrined in the 
Convention. What about the intensity test which is commonly applied by 
the ECtHR in order to trigger Article 3? As said by Judge Jočienė, in her 
dissenting opinion to the Valiuliene judgment, the «minimum level of se-
12 Para. 15 of Judge Spano’s opinion. 
13 European Court of Human Rights, Valiuliene v. Lithuania, Appl. No. 33234/07, 26 March 
2013.
14 P. 30 of the Valiuliene judgment. 
15 Talpis, cit., para. 130.
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verity» must be proved16. As a consequence, in the case of «very minor 
injuries», a case of domestic violence must be exclusively examined under 
Article 8 of the Convention17. In the Talpis case, we might argue that the 
level of severity had been reached, but the Court did not even mention 
the need to use a similar test. Accordingly, episodes of domestic violence 
are considered as sufficiently severe to trigger Article 3 of the Conven-
tion, without requiring an analysis of the level of intensity. Many scholars 
have discussed whether or not domestic violence can amount to torture, 
and, as early as the end of the nineteenth century, Frances Power Cobbe 
wrote a revolutionary article on the equation that domestic violence is 
torture, namely “Wife-torture in England”18. A very convincing argument 
is the one proposed by the then UN Special Rapporteur on torture and 
other inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment Manfred Nowak, who, in an 
illuminating report of 2008, outlined the element of powerlessness that 
characterises both domestic violence and torture: «the intention to keep 
the victim in a permanent state of fear based on unpredictable violence 
by seeking to reduce the person to submission and destroy his/her capac-
ity for resistance and autonomy with the ultimate aim of achieving total 
control»19. 
3.3 Domestic Violence as Discrimination on the Basis of Gender 
The third consideration refers to the prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of gender. The Court read Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 2 
and 3 of the European Convention. Referring to the Opuz v. Turkey and the 
Eremia v. Moldova20 case, the Court confirmed that discrimination occurs 
where it is possible to affirm that the acts of the authorities do not only 
amount to a failure to respond to episodes of violence, but also to a «re-
peated tolerance» that «reflect[s] a discriminatory attitude with regard to 
the applicant as woman»21. Mentioning worrying data on domestic violence 
in Italy, the Court acknowledged first that the phenomenon mainly affects 
women, and that, despite the reforms undertaken, a significant number 
16 Para. 14 of the Judge Jočienė’s opinion.
17 Para. 15 of the Judge Jočienė’s opinion.
18 Contemporary Review, Strahan & Co.; First Edition (1878). See a reflection on the evolu-
tion, and related references, in S. De Vido, Donne, violenza, diritto internazionale. La Con-
venzione di Istanbul del Consiglio d’Europa del 2011, Milano, 2016. 
19 A/HRC/7/3, para. 45.
20 European Court of Human Rights, Eremia v. Moldova, Appl. No. 3564/11, 28 May 2013.
21 Talpis, cit., para. 141. 
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of women is killed by their partners or former partners; secondly, that 
socio-cultural attitudes on domestic violence continue22. This affirmation 
differs from the judgment in the Rumor case, in which the Court posited 
that the Italian legal framework with regard to domestic violence was ef-
fective. According to the majority of the judges, «the circumstances were 
different»23, since the application of Italian criminal law in the most recent 
judgment did not prevent physical assault against the woman. Given the 
elements of the case, the majority of the judges concluded that a violation 
of the prohibition of discrimination occurred. 
In his partly dissenting opinion, Judge Eicke summarised the jurispru-
dence of the Court on the application of Article 14 combined with Article 
2 and 3 of the European Convention, stressing that, absent any evidence 
of discriminatory treatment by the officials, a violation of the prohibition 
of discrimination can arise only in cases of a «clear and systemic failure» 
of the national authorities to appreciate and address the seriousness and 
extent of the problem of the problem of domestic violence24. Therefore, ac-
cording to the Judge, in the case at issue, the question was not only a mat-
ter of statistics, but whether or not the judgment in the Rumor case was 
premature or the situation in Italy had significantly changed in the lapses 
of time between the two judgments. However, as correctly pointed out by 
the Judge, the Court has not argued why it considered the Italian system 
effective in the Rumor case, and not effective in the Talpis one. Judge 
Spano reached a similar conclusion, arguing that «societal discrimination 
and high levels of domestic violence […] are not, in and of themselves, 
enough to ground a finding of an Article 14 violation»25, and that «there 
is insufficient evidence of institutional discrimination in Italy», being the 
relevant framework being one that is effective26. 
4 Some Conclusions in Light of the Istanbul Convention
Given the analysis above, we might argue that positive obligations of 
States in responding to cases of domestic violence must be reconceived 
in light of the Istanbul Convention. In the Talpis case, the Court was well 
aware of the impact of the Istanbul Convention, where it stated that States 
have “particular” (particulière) due diligence obligations, and that the 
22 Talpis, cit., para. 145. 
23 Talpis, cit., para. 146. 
24 Para. 19 of Judge Eicke’s opinion.
25 Para. 21 of the Judge Eicke’s opinion. 
26 Para. 23 of the Judge Eicke’s opinion.
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peculiarity of acts of domestic violence, as acknowledged in the preamble 
of the Istanbul Convention, «must be taken into account» during internal 
proceedings27. Article 49 of the Istanbul Convention provides that «Par-
ties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that 
investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence 
covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue de-
lay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages 
of the criminal proceedings», and Article 50 is aimed at ensuring that the 
«responsible law enforcement agencies respond to all forms of violence 
covered by the scope of this Convention promptly and appropriately by 
offering adequate and immediate protection to victims». 
We might therefore argue that the “Osman test” with regard to Article 
2 of the Convention, and the due diligence requirement must be read in 
light of the Istanbul Convention, in the sense that national authorities 
must consider the specific conditions of vulnerability of the victim, and 
adopt preventive measures even in the absence of the strict requirement 
of immediacy. In other words, in a situation similar to the one brought 
before the Court, the immediacy requirement should be satisfied given 
a “present” risk of violence (the fact that the woman found refuge in a 
shelter for women, that she reported episodes of violence to the authori-
ties, that she called the police the night of the murder, etc.). The ECtHR is 
challenging – although not explicitly – the Osman test through the Istanbul 
Convention, following the pioneering thought of Judge De Albuquerque in 
the Valiuliene case. 
An interesting element that was not analysed either by the Court or by 
the dissenting judges is linked to the support States are obliged to give 
to shelters for victims of violence under the Istanbul Convention. The 
applicant found refuge from her husband thanks to a local association. 
However, the social services of the municipality of Udine notified the as-
sociation that there were no funds available to guarantee to the applicant 
another refuge or to pay the refuge found by the association itself. The 
Government counter-argued that the social services in Udine, which had 
developed a programme for victims of violence, were not in charge of 
the situation and therefore could not pay for the applicant’s refuge man-
aged by a private association; the victim should have contacted the social 
services to ask for help28. In light of the Istanbul Convention, States are 
required to «recognise, encourage and support at all levels, the work of 
relevant non‐ governmental organisations and of civil society active in 
combating violence against women and establish effective co‐operation 
with these organisations» (Article 9 Istanbul Convention). Even though 
27 Talpis, cit., para. 129. 
28 Talpis, cit., paras. 25 and 26. 
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the woman could have reported her situation to the social services of the 
municipality, nothing should have prevented her to receive a concrete aid 
by a private association, which, in turn, should have been financially sup-
ported by the competent authorities. Therefore, in the application of Arti-
cle 14 of the Convention on Human Rights, the Court could have concluded 
that, despite remarkable and fundamental steps forward in the protection 
of women from domestic violence, the Italian legislative framework and 
its application by national authorities systematically discriminate against 
women. The Istanbul Convention obliges States to take concrete steps in 
countering violence against women and domestic violence, and can be 
used by the ECtHR judges to interpret the rights granted by the Conven-
tion in terms of positive obligations. 

